Articles

- Pereboom, Derk, “Robust Nonreductive Materialism,” The Journal of Philosophy,

Vol. 99, No. 10 (Oct., 2002), pp. 499-531: Distinguishes nonreductive physicalism from emergentism, uses the co-constitution of mental and physical properties to solve exlusion problem.

- Esfeld, Michael, “Mental Causation and Mental Properties,” Dialectica, Vol. 59 No. 1: Uses token identity and multiple realizability to argue for the causal efficacy of functional mental properties.
- Whittle, Ann, “The Co-Instantiation Thesis,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 85. No. 1: Uses co-instantiation thesis as an answer to causal exclusion problem. Argues that prior versions of this thesis have lacked adequate metaphysical framework. *
- Marcus, Eric, “Mental Causation: Unnaturalized but not Unnatural,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 63 No. 1: Systematic overdetermination is acceptable; argues for a non-naturalist account of mental causation that is compatible with physicalism.
- Pineda, David, “The Causal Exclusion Puzzle,”
- Funkhouser, Eric, “Three Varieties of Causal Overdetermination,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly: Independent, Incorporating, Iterative Overdetermination.
- Ehring, Douglas, “Part-Whole Physicalism and Mental Causation,”: An identity solution. Mental types are composed of physical types.
- De Muijnck, Wim, “Two Types of Mental Causation,”: Higher level causation and exploitation. Similar to supervenient causation and downward causation. New distinction solves problem of mental causation.
- Vicente, Agustin, “The Overdetermination Argument Revisited,” Mental causes are indeed causes but they do not cause physical effects.
- Clayton, Philip, “Natural Law and Divine Action: The Search for an Expanded Theory of Causation,”: Uses emergence theory to offer an expanded theory of causation that reconciles the tension between downward causes and microcausation.
- Marcus, Eric, “Mental Causation in a Physical World,” Philosophical Studies, 2005: Distinction between causal completeness and closure.
- Bontly, Thomas, “Proportionality, Causation, and Exclusion,” Goldilocks principle and causal exclusion.

- Ritchie, Jack, “Causal Compatibilism – What Chance?” Erkenntnis, 2005: Using counterfactuals and conditional probabilities to overcome problem of causal exclusion.
- Lowe, E.J., “Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and the Problem of Mental Causation,” Erkenntnis 2006: Non-Cartesian substance dualism is better equipped for mental causation than physicalism.
- Rupert, Robert, “Functionalism, Mental Causation, and the Problem of Metaphysically Necessary Effects,” Nous 2006: Tension between metaphysically necessary effects and multiply realizable causal functional properties.
- Jaworski, William, “Mental Causation from the Top Down,” Erkenntnis 2006: Liberating dual attribute theory from problematic assumptions about psychophysical relations.
- Lyons, Jack, “In Defense of Epiphenomenalism,” Philosophical Psychology, 2006: Scientific accounts of mentality are only possible given the truth of epiphenomenalism.
- Walter, Sven, “The Epistemological Approach to Mental Causation,” Erkenn 2007: Abandon metaphysical considerations in light of epistemological ones. Argues that this approach to causation does not have an advantage over metaphysical approaches.
- MacDonald, Graham, “Emergence and Causal Powers,” Erkenn 2007: Causal relevance of mental properties is consistent with there being no downward causation, so the problem of epiphenomenalism is avoided. *
- Horgan, Terry, “Mental Causation and the Agent-Exclusion Problem,” Erkenn 2007: Vindicating agency by showing that intentional content is compatible with the mental state causation of behavior hypothesis.
- Noordhof, Paul, “Micro-based Properties and The Supervenience Argument: A Response to Kim,”: The real issue is when/if/whether determinate micro-properties yield novel properties. This may show that a key premise in the supervenience argument is false. *
- Schroder, Jurgen, “The Supervenience Argument and the Generalization Problem,” Erkenntnis 2002: Kim’s argument against the generalization of Problem of Causal Exclusion is unsuccessful. The argument does generalize.
- Kim, Jaegwon, “Blocking Causal Drainage and Other Maintenance Chores with Mental Causation,” For causal drainage to occur, one must rule out the reduction option for purely physical properties.
- Marras, Ausonio, “Kim’s Supervenience Argument and Nonreductive Physicalism,” Erkenntnis 2007: Some assumptions in Kim are question-

begging; reductio structure leaves open which premise is to be rejected. *

- Schroder, Jurgen, “Mental Causation and the Supervenience Argument,” Erkenntnis 2007: Causal closure is probably false, and causes must be proportional to their effects. *
- Welshon, Rex, “Emergence, Supervenience, and Realization,” Phil Studies 2002: Emergent downward causation does not entail overdetermination. *
- Bontly, Thomas, “The Supervenience Argument Generalizes,” Phil Studies 2002: Another argument that the supervenience argument generalizes.
- Witmer, D. Gene, “Functionalism and Causal Exclusion,” Pacific Phil Quarterly 2003: An argument that functionalism is compatible with mental causation against Occam’s Razor, a ban on overdetermination, and homogeneity.
- Day, Mark, “Explanatory Exclusion in History and Social Science,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 2004: Differences and similarities between Kim’s causal exclusion and exclusion in social science explanation.
- Khalidi, Muhammad Ali, “Against Functional Reductionism in Cognitive Science,” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2005: Functional reductionism is blocked if psychological properties are subdivided or crosscut by neurophysiological properties.
- Shapiro, Lawrence, “Can Psychology Be A Unified Science?” Philosophy of Science 2005: An argument defending the unity of psychological explanation against Kim’s argument for fractured explanation due to multiple realization.
- Van De Laar, Tjeerd, “Dynamical Systems Theory as an Approach to Mental Causation,” Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 2006: Downward causation through constraint of boundary conditions on local interactions; using systems theory.
- Marras, Ausonio, “Emergence and Reduction: Reply to Kim” Synthese 2006: distinction between reductively identifiable and reductively explainable; argues for ontologically distinct novel properties.
- Strand, Anders, “Immense Multiple Realization,” Int. Ontology Metaphysics 2007: functional reductionism cannot escape supervenience argument; functional reductionism leads to irrealism of mental properties; Kim gets counterfactual dependencies between macro-physical relata wrong.

- Keijzer, Fred, “Embedded Cognition and Mental Causation: Setting Empirical Bounds on Metaphysics,” Synthese 2007: process externalism undermines one of kim’s key premises.
- Ney, Alyssa, “Can an Appeal to Constitution Solve the Exclusion Problem?” Pacific Phil Quarterly 2007: The close connection of constitution renders overdetermination worries benign.
- Rueger, Alexander, “Reduction, Autonomy, and Causal Exclusion Among Physical Properties,” Synthese 2004: instances of macrostructural properties are parts of microstructural property instances.
- Kallestrup, Jesper, “The Causal Exclusion Argument,” Phil Studies 2006: nonreductive physicalist need not accept principle of property individuation that Kim depends on, clarifying overdetermination allows for rejection of causal exclusion, mental causation can’t be accounted for by counterfactual dependencies.
- Whittle, Ann, “The Co-Instantiation Thesis,” Australasian Journal of Phil. 2007: